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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SHADUR, Senior District Judge: 
 
Both of these appeals stem from the March 24, 1999 
order of the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware ("District Court Order," 231 B.R. 559 (D. Del. 
1999)) affirming a February 4, 1998 bankruptcy court order 
("Bankruptcy Court Order," 218 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D. Del. 
1998)). Both Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied 
Workers International Union ("GMU") and American Flint 
Glass Workers Union ("AFU") (collectively "Unions") 
challenge the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Anchor 
Resolution Corporation ("Anchor"), rejecting bankruptcy 
claims filed against Anchor by Unions. 
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Unions' claims arose out of four collective bargaining 
agreements ("CBAs")--two with GMU and two with AFU-- 
that Anchor, as debtor in possession under Chapter 11, 
had assumed and then had purported to "assign," pursuant 
to a sale of substantially all its assets, to Consumers 
Packaging, Inc. ("Consumers") and Owens-Brockway Glass 
Container Inc. (collectively "Purchaser"). Consumers in turn 
assigned all of its rights and obligations arising out of the 
purchase (including its interest in the CBAs) to a newly- 
formed wholly-owned subsidiary that then changed its 
name to Anchor Glass Container Corp. ("New Anchor"). 
 
Both the bankruptcy court and the district court found 
that the sale of Anchor's assets to Purchaser was an 
assumption by Anchor of all four CBAs, coupled with a 
simultaneous assignment of the rights and obligations 
under the CBAs to Purchaser (218 B.R. at 336; 231 B.R. at 
563). In addition, both courts below held that upon the 
February 5, 1997 closing of that sale, Code 365(k)1 served 
to relieve Anchor from all liability arising out of the CBAs, 
thus barring both Unions' claims. Finally, both courts held 
that no "modification" of the CBAs occurred to trigger 
application of Code 1113. 
 
Because Anchor did not in fact assign the GMU CBAs 
cum onere (as is essential to a true assignment), we reverse 
as to that Union and remand for an order allowing its 
claims and for a determination of the priority of payment 
that such claims shall receive. As to AFU, however, the 
valid assignment of its CBAs requires affirmance. 
 
Facts 
 
In March 1996 Anchor and GMU negotiated two CBAs 
covering GMU's bargaining unit for the three-year period 
from April 1, 1996 through March 31, 1999. Effective 
September 1, 1996 Anchor and AFU similarly negotiated 
two three-year CBAs covering AFU's bargaining unit. Both 
sets of CBAs included current concessions to Anchor in 
recognition of, and to assist it in surviving in the face of, its 
shaky financial condition. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. All references to Bankruptcy Code provisions will take the form "Code 
--," omitting repeated reference to Title 11. 
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In its CBAs, GMU agreed to certain wage cuts in 
exchange for deferred supplemental payments or possible 
payments to be made by Anchor to certain employees over 
the course of the CBAs' three-year terms. Those 
commitments by Anchor comprised (1) the reinstatement 
and retroactive payment, if Anchor were to be sold, merged 
or transferred during the term of the CBAs, of wage 
increases that had been given up in the first two years of 
the CBAs ("GMU Retroactive Wage Claim"), (2) a $700 one- 
time payment to employees on the payroll as of April 1, 
1996 and (3) a $300 Vitro stock bonus. In the aggregate, 
the value of those commitments came to $6,284,896. 
 
As for AFU, it agreed to similar wage cuts in return for 
two supplemental payment obligations (together "AFU 
Bonus Claims"): (1) a $300 bonus (the "$300 Sign-on 
Bonus") and (2) further bonuses ranging from $450 to 
$650, depending on the job category of the particular 
employee. Those items had an aggregate value of $323,000. 
 
Despite those concessions by the Unions, soon after 
negotiating the CBAs--on September 13, 1996--Anchor 
filed its voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 (it 
had then signed a letter of intent for the sale of 
substantially all of its assets to competitor Ball-Foster 
Glass Container Co., L.L.C. ("Ball-Foster")). Anchor and 
Ball-Foster then negotiated and signed an October 4, 1996 
asset purchase agreement, which was expressly made 
subject to higher and better offers. 
 
In conjunction with its motion for the bankruptcy court's 
approval of the Ball-Foster agreement, Anchor filed a notice 
of assumption and assignment of certain executory 
contracts on November 1, 1996 ("Notice"). That Notice 
announced a November 22, 1996 hearing date to consider 
approval of the asset sale agreement, including Anchor's 
assumption and assignment of the contracts listed in the 
Notice ("Sale Hearing"). Anchor listed all four CBAs in the 
Notice, which set an objection deadline of November 15 (one 
week before the Sale Hearing). In addition the Notice 
provided that "the Sale Hearing may be adjourned from 
time to time without further notice other than an 
announcement in open court of the adjourned date or dates 
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at the originally scheduled sale hearing or any adjourned 
dates." 
 
Because a better offer did come in, the Ball-Foster deal 
did not go forward. Instead, on December 20, 1996 the 
bankruptcy court entered its "Sale Order," approving 
Purchaser's bid as documented in a December 18, 1996 
asset purchase agreement ("Agreement") between Anchor 
and Purchaser. Neither Union objected at that point to the 
sale of substantially all of Anchor's assets to Purchaser, 
including Anchor's proposed assumption and assignment of 
the CBAs. 
 
On January 31, 1997 the bankruptcy court entered an 
order, assertedly under the auspices of Code 365, 
approving Anchor's assumption and assignment of the 
CBAs to Purchaser and providing that Anchor would 
thereby be relieved from further liability under the CBAs. 
Anchor and Purchaser closed the asset sale transaction on 
February 5, 1997 after each of GMU and AFU agreed to 
waive--but only against Purchaser--certain of its rights 
under the CBAs.2 After the closing of the sale neither 
Anchor nor Purchaser made any of the supplemental 
payments called for by the CBAs. New Anchor, however, 
promised a $.40 per hour wage increase. Unions filed 
claims against Anchor's bankruptcy estate for the value of 
the CBA-specified supplemental payments, and both lower 
courts disallowed Unions' claims. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Jurisdiction initially vested in the bankruptcy court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 157(b). Jurisdiction for the district 
court's review of the bankruptcy court's order was 
conferred by 28 U.S.C. 158(a). In turn, our appellate 
jurisdiction rests upon 28 U.S.C. 158(d) and 1291. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. GMU waived, as to Purchaser only, its members' rights to the 
retroactive wage increases that were to be triggered by reason of the sale 
of Anchor's assets to Purchaser, as well as its members' rights to the 
$300 Vitro stock bonus. AFU waived, as to Purchaser only, its members' 
rights to the $300 Sign-on Bonus. Both Unions refused to waive any 
rights against Anchor. 
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As taught by such cases as In re Krystal Cadillac 
Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 142 F.3d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 
1998): 
 
          In undertaking our review, we stand in the shoes of the 
          district court, applying a clearly erroneous standard to 
          the bankruptcy court's findings of fact and a plenary 
          standard to that court's legal conclusions. 
 
Because this appeal involves review of the grant of 
summary judgment, a purely legal determination, we apply 
a de novo standard of review. 
 
Code 365(k): Assignment "of a contract" 
 
As the bankruptcy court correctly noted, in the absence 
of a bankruptcy filing the common law rule as to 
contractual assignments is exemplified by In re Washington 
Capital Aviation & Leasing, 156 B.R. 167, 175 n.3 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1993)(citations omitted): 
 
          A party subject to a contractually created obligation 
          ordinarily cannot divest itself of liability by substituting 
          another in its place without the consent of the party 
          owed the duty. While the assignee may be entitled to 
          perform for the original obligor, the original obligor 
          remains ultimately liable until discharged by 
          performance or otherwise. 
 
As the flip side of that common law rule, a novation occurs 
when the obligee does consent to a substitution of a new 
obligor for the old one, thus relieving the original obligor 
from its duty to perform the novated obligations (see, e.g., 
La Salle Nat'l Bank v. Bachmann, 108 B.R. 1013, 1016 
(N.D. Ill. 1989)). 
 
In the bankruptcy context, however, Code 365(k) 
changes the common law rule by effecting a novation by 
operation of law whether or not the obligee consents to the 
substitution (see, e.g., Wainer v. A.J. Equities, Ltd. 984 F.2d 
679, 683-84 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). But consistently 
with the basic concept of a contract's assignment, under 
which every contractual assignee takes the entire bundle of 
rights and obligations under the contract, such a forced 
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novation is dependent on just such a total undertaking by 
the assignee. Code 365(k)(emphasis added) provides: 
 
          Assignment by the trustee3 to an entity of a contract or 
          lease assumed under this section relieves the trustee 
          and the estate from any liability for any breach of such 
          contract or lease occurring after such assignment. 
 
Where Congress uses legal terms that have "accumulated 
settled meaning" under common law, it must be presumed 
(unless of course the statute dictates otherwise) that 
Congress meant to employ that established meaning (see, 
e.g., Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995) and cases cited 
there). Hence we construe the terms in Code 365(k) to 
incorporate the general common law of assignments. In 
particular, we will follow the dominant consensus of 
common law jurisdictions, rather than the law of any 
particular jurisdiction (id. at 71). 
 
That dominant consensus conforms to the clear meaning 
of the language involved: that an assignment of a contract 
as such involves a commitment by the assignee to perform 
all obligations under the contract, as well as to acquire all 
rights created by the contract.4 But here neither party to 
the sale transaction intended a true assignment of all rights 
and obligations created by the GMU CBAs. In fact, Anchor 
and Purchaser directly manifested their intent to assign 
less than all of the GMU CBA obligations--for Agreement 
10.01(h)(ii) expressly placed this condition (among others) 
on Purchaser's obligation to close the sale: 
 
          any retroactive (but not prospective) payments of wage 
          increases forfeited in prior periods under such 
          [collective bargaining] agreements as a result of the 
          consummation of the transactions contemplated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. For purposes of this analysis, the term "trustee" is synonymous with 
"debtor in possession," and hence it encompasses debtor Anchor in this 
case (see Code 1107). 
 
4. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts 328 (1981); U.C.C. 2- 
210(4)(1998); 4 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 906, at 628- 
30 (1951 & 1999 supp. by Lawrence A. Cunningham and Arthur J. 
Jacobson); Art Metal Constr. Co. v. Lehigh Structural Steel Co.,116 F.2d 
57, 58-59 (3d Cir. 1940). 
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          hereby shall have been waived or the Bankruptcy 
          Court shall have issued an order, not subject to stay, 
          that Seller may assign and the applicable Buyer may 
          assume such collective bargaining agreements without 
     any acceleration of the deferred wage increases 
     negotiated under the current agreements. 
 
It could not have been made more clear that Purchaser 
had no intent, and certainly no obligation, to close on the 
contemplated sale transaction unless it could shed any 
responsibility for the payment to GMU's members of their 
previously-bargained-for entitlement to receive retroactive 
wages upon the closing. To put the matter most simply, the 
GMU CBA that Purchaser was willing to (and did) accept 
was not the same GMU CBA that Anchor had originally 
negotiated, and had then assumed, post-bankruptcy. 
Purchaser attempts to avoid that fatal flaw by telescoping 
the two steps of assumption and assignment, but that is 
wholly unpersuasive. Hence it is equally clear that no 
assignment "of the [GMU] contract[s]" occurred such as to 
trigger application of Code 365(k). 
 
Because the Code provision thus did not intervene to 
change the common law rule as to the GMU CBAs, that 
rule and its consequence still obtain. Having shifted fewer 
than all of the obligations (although it did assign all of the 
rights) created by the GMU CBAs, Anchor remains liable on 
those contractual obligations. We therefore reverse the 
orders below disallowing the GMU claims and remand for a 
proper disposition of those claims. 
 
Code 1113: Modification of CBAs 
 
There is another string to GMU's bow, woven from the 
same line of analysis. By committing itself to Agreement 
10.01(h), Anchor has run afoul of Code 1113(f): 
 
          No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a 
          trustee to unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions 
          of a collective bargaining agreement prior to 
          compliance with the provisions of this section. 
 
In that respect we hold that when as here a debtor in 
possession (the legal equivalent of a "trustee" for Code 
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1113(f) purposes) binds itself contractually to obtain a 
change in the legal relations created by a CBA as a 
condition precedent to closing a sale of substantially all of 
the debtor's assets, that constitutes an attempt to effect an 
alteration of the CBA. That being so, Anchor was required 
to comply with the procedures set out in Code 1113--and 
it did not. 
 
Code 1113 and its procedures were enacted as a 
congressional overruling of NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 
U.S. 513 (1984), in order to buffer CBAs against 
uncontrolled inroads whenever financial distress drives an 
employer into the bankruptcy courts in an effort to 
reorganize (In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 137 (3d 
Cir. 1997) and In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 956 (3d 
Cir. 1992), both citing Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. v. Air Line 
Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 922 F.2d 984, 989-90 (2d Cir. 1990)). But 
here Anchor and Purchaser have sought to misuse the 
Code in an effort to avoid the collective bargaining process 
that Congress deemed essential to the balance between 
labor and reorganizing debtors that it struck in Section 
1113. 
 
In effect, the Agreement's condition precedent stripped 
GMU of whatever bargaining power it might otherwise have 
had. Union representatives in a situation such as that 
presented by the Agreement here have a Hobson's choice 
between two evils: save the members' jobs minus the 
retroactive wages, or don't save the jobs at all. Because 
Anchor's attempted application of the assumption and 
assignment provisions operated here to frustrate 
congressional intent as expressed in Section 1113, we again 
find that those provisions did not operate to novate the 
retroactive wage obligations that were the subject of the 
condition precedent. This serves as an alternative basis for 
reversing the order disallowing GMU's Retroactive Wage 
Claim. 
 
AFU's Bonus Claims 
 
Neither of the just-completed lines of analysis, however, 
operates to preserve the AFU Bonus Claims. Agreement 
10.01(h)(ii) did not make the closing of the sale contingent 
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on the waiver of those claims, unlike the retroactive wage 
payments to GMU members that Purchasers refused to 
commit to contractually. Instead the assumption of the AFU 
CBAs by Anchor and their assignment in turn to Purchaser 
were unconditional so far as the buyer-seller transaction 
was concerned (that was the express requirement of 
Agreement 9.05). And that being so, nothing in the special 
Code 1113(f) prohibition against altering a CBA without 
full compliance with the Code 1113 procedures operated 
to trump the Code 365(k) change of the common law rule 
as to all true assumption-and-assignment situations. 
 
That being the case, there remains the argument that 
Anchor's non-adherence to the Code 1113 route as to the 
AFU CBAs leaves it liable despite Code 365(k)'s plain 
language. Code 1113(a) reads: 
 
          The debtor in possession...may assume or reject a 
          collective bargaining agreement only in accordance 
          with the provisions of this section. 
 
Accordingly, the argument goes, Code 1113 and not 365 
is the governing provision here. That contention rests on an 
extraordinarily thin reed: that the mere presence of the 
word "assume" in Code 1113(a) requires the application of 
that provision even where no modification or rejection of a 
CBA has occurred. But that argument is at odds with the 
plain reading of Code 1113, which (like the specific 
prohibition in Code 1113(f)) speaks only to what must be 
done by a party in bankruptcy to change--or to free itself 
entirely from--the terms of a CBA (Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. 
Bachner, 865 F.2d 1106, 1111 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989); Mass. 
Air Conditioning & Heating Corp. v. McCoy, 196 B.R. 659, 
662-63 (D. Mass. 1996)). It is surely no accident that Code 
1113 is entitled "Rejection of collective bargaining 
agreements," although we of course recognize that such 
legislative captions are not part of the statute itself. We are 
persuaded that Code 365 and not Code 1113 is the 
applicable provision in the circumstances here. 
 
So AFU's effort to give up a portion of its members' CBA 
rights (the $300 Sign-on Bonus) against Purchaser at the 
latter's request, while simultaneously reserving all of the 
AFU Bonus Claims against Anchor, fails. Anchor's outright 
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and unconditional assignment of the AFU CBAs to 
Purchaser triggered the statutory novation effected by Code 
365(k). 
 
Conclusion 
 
We reverse the District Court Order affirming the 
Bankruptcy Court Order as to GMU and remand for a 
determination of the priority of payment to which GMU's 
claims--fully preserved against Anchor--are entitled. As to 
the AFU Bonus Claims, however, we affirm the District 
Court Order. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
          Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
          for the Third Circuit 
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